Under the Radar: Admiral Halsey at the End of World War II (Part I)

In researching the World War II activities of an old friend, Ambassador F. Haydn Williams, it became evident to me that aside from U.S. Navy efforts at finding and rescuing American POWs in Japan, there seemed to be little information about what the Navy was doing in the two weeks leading up to the formal Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945. What was happening with the 3rd Fleet, one of largest naval fleets ever assembled, during this two-week period?

After the Surrender Announcement 

In his 1947 autobiography, Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey reveals the time gap of the two-plus weeks that followed the 15 August announcement by the Japanese Emperor that Japan was quitting the war. There are five pages in Halsey’s book covering this time, with only general references to what was happening with the 3rd Fleet.¹ The formal surrender ceremony would not be held until 2 September 1945 on board the USS Missouri (BB-63)—a long time to be sitting on your hands if you were Bull Halsey. On 14 August, Halsey’s forces were still attacking the main Japanese island of Honshu. The next day, one of the most massive fleets ever formed was quiet, yet still steaming off the coast of its once mortal enemy.

An analysis of the fleet messages sent and received during this time, as revealed in Admiral Chester Nimitz’ Gray Book, are telling. Nimitz described the movements of the 3rd Fleet innocuously on 20 August as “continuing to replenish and reform today.”² A similar non-specific description was noted for 22 August: “Units of the 3rd Fleet have completed replenishment, have reformed for the pending operation, and are operating at economical speed, in areas assigned.”³ In fact, Halsey and the 3rd Fleet were cruising under the radar of most of the world. They were now working with the new Supreme Allied Commander for Allied Powers in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, in implementing the early stages of the occupation of defeated Japan.

Aside from the beginning of efforts to find American POWs in Japan, Halsey’s book reveals little about what happened between 15 August and when the fleet entered Sagami Bay on 28 Augustand then Tokyo Bay on 29 August. The autobiography almost seems to jump from 15 August to the 2 September surrender ceremony where, according to Halsey: “Newsreels show MacArthur putting his arm around my shoulders at this moment and whispering to me. . . ‘Start ’em now!’ I said, ‘Aye, aye sir!’”⁴ Where, upon Halsey’s signal, soon was heard the growing thunder of the hundreds of Navy planes and Army Air Corps B-29s that roared overhead, culminating in what Theodore White, in In Search of History, described as the most incredible show of air power in human history:

Four hundred B-29s, the fire-bombers that had leveled Japan, had taken off from Guam and Saipan hours before. . . . came, low, low over the Missouri, and fifteen hundred fleet planes rose above and around their wings. There they were, speckling the sky in flocks of scudding gray; it was American power at zenith. They dipped over the Missouri, passed on over Yokohama, inland over Tokyo to brandish the threat, then back out to sea again. . . The planes paraded their triumph over Tokyo Bay as Caesar’s legionnaires had paraded theirs in Rome. . . . It was the supreme moment of air power.⁵

“Aye, aye, Sir!” says a lot. For those two plus weeks before the official surrender, Admiral Halsey had a new boss, the newly named Supreme Commander General Douglas MacArthur. Halsey had delivered a lot for MacArthur in those two weeks, much of it lost in the euphoria at the war’s end and in the fog of history. Leaving his own autobiography vague about most of what had happened in those two weeks is also part of that story. There was room for only one principal actor in postwar Japan, and that was Douglas MacArthur. That meant that Halsey’s other “boss,” U.S. Navy Commander in Chief Pacific (CINPAC,) Chester W. Nimitz, would be taking a back seat. It also meant that everyone in the chain-of-command, including “Bull” Halsey, would defer to the new Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers when it came to writing the history of the war’s end.

Nimitz and MacArthur

There has never been much controversy over the fact that Chester Nimitz and Douglas MacArthur did not like each other. It would be hard to confine two such powerful men in any room. Their antipathy toward each other was partially personality-driven—with MacArthur as the showman and self-promoter; and Nimitz the more reserved and quiet one. But at its core, their relationship was characterized by an ongoing four-year power struggle about who would command the Pacific War.

Initially, Nimitz had prevailed and drawn lines isolating MacArthur’s dominance to the “Southwest Pacific Area,” which included Australia, New Guinea, and the Philippines. Nimitz maintained control over the vast “Central Pacific,” which included Midway, the Marshall Islands, and the now-famous battlefields of Guam, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. But by mid-year 1945, the war was coming to an end and the outcome was a foregone conclusion—Japan would either surrender or be destroyed in one last Allied invasion of its main islands. Plans had to be made for a postwar Japan.

Halsey had been home in 1945. He and Raymond Spruance alternately controlled what was called the 3rd Fleet under Halsey and then renamed the 5th Fleet when Spruance was in command. Halsey needed a break from the war, but the Navy also wanted him home to talk about the big picture. He was sent east to Washington, where he met with military leaders such as Admiral Ernest King and General George Marshall. He also spent an hour at the White House with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In these discussions, there undoubtedly were conversations about the war coming to an end, and what potential roles Halsey might need to play.

Halsey was a person people liked, and he liked people. He was not one to burn bridges, but rather build relationships. In his early Navy days, he had first met then-Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt while on training maneuvers with his destroyer off the coast of New England in 1913. He had reluctantly given the Secretary the helm of the ship but found out Roosevelt was “a nearly ‘professional sailorman,’ handling the ship with skill and sparking an acquaintance between the Navy man and patrician politician.”⁶ He would meet Roosevelt again later, after the United States entered the war against Germany in World War I.

Army vs. Navy

There was probably not a doubt in Washington that the Army would be in charge in postwar Japan. This is one of things armies do—they occupy defeated territory. Coupled with that was the realization there was no American military leader as familiar with the Far East as Douglas MacArthur. He had lived in the Philippines for years as chief advisor to the Philippine Military while the country was still under American control. As the outlook for war worsened, he was recalled to active duty by the U.S. Army. MacArthur was born and bred Army. His father was a Medal of Honor winner from the Civil War. MacArthur had been raised on Army posts, had attended West Point, and had distinguished himself on the battlefield in World War I—and he was good at letting the press and public know of his military pedigree.

In addition, there was MacArthur’s own political ambition. His name had been touted from time to time as a possible presidential candidate, speculation which he did not discourage. Looking toward running himself in 1948, it surely occurred to President Harry S. Truman that it would not be easy for MacArthur to run for national office if he was tied up in rebuilding a defeated Japan. To cap it all off, MacArthur would now be called the “Supreme Commander” for the Allied Powers in the Pacific, an apt title for a big ego. Though it must have been a hard pill to swallow, Nimitz knew it was not going to be him after a trip to the West Coast in early July 1945. When President Truman announced MacArthur’s appointment, Nimitz sent a message to General MacArthur on 15 August: “Please accept my hearty congratulations on your appointment as Supreme Commander for the occupation of JAPAN and my assurance of full support of the forces and resources available to me.”⁷ If MacArthur ever responded, it is not listed in Nimitz’s Gray Book.

The Postwar Years

In style and approach, the postwar years mimicked these same traits in Nimitz and MacArthur. MacArthur published his memoirs; Nimitz never did. Nimitz did compile a list of messages and fleet summary activities that he had sent or received during the war years. Called the Nimitz Gray Book, reading it is a slog for even the most dedicated researchers. The messages generally follow chronologically in four separate sections—at least that is the organization as compiled by Nimitz in the time period of this analysis, July–August 1945. Today, all have been declassified. Some were “Top Secret” and “Nimitz Only” messages. Some entries were summaries of naval actions that were happening throughout the Pacific. There are more than 3,000 pages in the Gray Book. Yet they do not include every message or briefing summary sent and received by Admiral Nimitz and his command. Nimitz selected the messages to be included, leaving the reader/researcher the job of trying to connect all the dots.

In addition to his memoirs, titled Reminiscences, MacArthur’s history of the Pacific war written with his approval, was published by the U.S. Army after his death. Released in 1966, it was a self-congratulatory tome of more than 450 pages titled Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific. General Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, inserted this disclaimer in the foreword:

While he lived, General MacArthur was unwilling to approve the reproduction and dissemination of the Reports, because he believed they needed further editing and correction of some inaccuracies. His passing permits publication but not the correction he deemed desirable. In publishing them, the Department of the Army must therefore disclaim any responsibility for their accuracy. But the Army also recognizes that these volumes have substantial and enduring value, and it believes the American people are entitled to have them made widely available through government publication.⁸

In other words, what we are reading in the Reports is 100-percent Douglas MacArthur, his view of history, and of himself. To give one a sense of how much MacArthur is the focus of this book, it is worth reading the rendition of how he landed in Japan at the Atsugi airfield on 30 August 1945:

Shortly after 1400 a famous C-54—the name “Bataan” in large letters on its nose—circled the field and glided in for a landing. From it stepped General MacArthur, accompanied by General Sutherland and his other staff officers. The Supreme Commander’s first words to General Eichelberger and the men of the Eighth Army and the 11th Airborne Division who greeted him were:

From Melborne to Tokyo is a long road. It has been a long and hard road, but this looks like the payoff. The surrender plans are going splendidly and completely according to previous arrangements. In all outlying areas, fighting has practically ceased.

In this area a week ago, there were 300,000 troops which have been disarmed and demobilized. The Japanese seem to be acting in complete good faith. There is every hope of the success of the capitulation without undue friction and without unnecessary bloodshed.⁹

It could not have been scripted any better had it been written by a Hollywood screenwriter. The Reports are testament in themselves as to why William Manchester titled his book on MacArthur The American Caesar.

That is who MacArthur thought he was. He wanted the American occupation of Japan to be Army only, or at least primarily Army, and he wanted to be seen as the liberator. Yet, he was confronted by the reality that at the time of the surrender, the primary American presence around the main Japanese islands was in the hands of his old nemesis, Nimitz, and the U.S. Navy. Anticipating a Japanese surrender, the U.S. Joints Chiefs of Staff had issued an opinion giving the Navy a prominent role in the initial days, which stated:

It appears to JCS that immediate naval occupation of critical ports of Japan is desirable to include in each case, if practical, an operational airfield to facilitate communication and permit airborne landings. . . In order to produce a continuity of policy of procedure in dealing with the Japanese Imperial Headquarters or its Ministries a representative of General MacArthur will be designated to perform this function until General MacArthur has actually landed in Japan and personally assumed this responsibility. The foregoing provisions will not be allowed to interfere with conduct of local surrenders by Naval or other U.S. commanders concerned.¹⁰

It is interesting to note the date given to this “JCS Study,” as it was called: 21 July 1945. It was becoming clear to the Joint Chiefs by mid-July that the war was coming to a close. How would an occupation of Japan be handled? Though the JCS Study made efforts to mollify MacArthur, that didn’t mean he liked it. On 13August, Nimitz’s representative, Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, sent his boss a message from Manila, where he had been meeting with MacArthur on the expected surrender of the Japanese and the upcoming occupation:

[MacArthur] reiterated in most emphatic terms his disapproval of the use of a fleet landing force prior to the arrival of troops in strength and prior to the clearance of Japanese forces from the area under armistice arrangements. This disapproval is based on both military grounds and effect on service relationships.¹¹

Forrest Sherman was a traveling man. Since MacArthur didn’t want to fly to Guam, nor Nimitz to Manila, it became Sherman’s role to fly back and forth from Guam to Manila to try to negotiate the fine line between Navy and Army roles in the surrender and occupation of Japan. Sherman had gone to Manila earlier on 29 Julyand, at that time, had sent a similar message to Admiral Charles “Soc” McMorris, Chief-of-Staff to Nimitz, back in Guam:

Cordially received. Had long and very amicable conference with General MacArthur. He accedes to naval features and to naval and air show of force as soon as fighting stops. He considers it unwise to risk landing any marines or seizing airfields until troops arrive in strength. He had the JCS message but did not consider it a directive and has asked for one.

Unless I receive other instructions, I will adjust plans to make all early landings contingent operations with timing to be determined later . . . . ¹²

The message was clear: MacArthur was not interested in any naval landing forces going ashore in Japan before he and the Army arrived.

It is interesting also that Sherman’s message to McMorris on 29 July had been sent on Navy communications only—it had gone out under the name of COM7THFLEET (Kincaid’s command) to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ in Guam. McMorris messaged back a few hours later: “Do not concur that landing of marines or occupying airfields must be deferred until troops land in strength.” And then these words, which may have opened the door for a solution: “The naval officer on the spot must be free to act expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and judgement to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussion . . .”¹³ Ultimately, this response would open a solution that MacArthur could accept. If that “naval officer on the spot” were one William F. Halsey, it was probably a provision that he could live with.

The Supreme Commander

As noted earlier, the issue of naval forces seizing ports and airfields had been addressed again at the 13 August meeting in Manila, with neither side giving way. Sherman would go back to Manila one more time, three days later on 16 August, this time to meet with the Japanese representatives sent by the Emperor. There was a new reality now. General Douglas MacArthur had become “Supreme Commander.” The message traffic is not clear exactly how it happened, but the Navy, as it related to the occupation of the main Japanese islands had now come under MacArthur’s control. There would now be landings of Americans at certain Japanese ports and airfields prior to the “landings in force” as had been earlier envisioned by MacArthur. The landing parties would be termed “advance parties,” “garrison forces,” or as some type of minor force. They would be primarily Navy and Marine forces, and they would be directed by that naval officer in command who had earned the respect and trust of Douglas MacArthur—William F. Halsey.